June 16, 1935 (May 16) Otsugase, Lianghekou meetings failed to resolve differences in the tao and central.

1935, 16, 2009, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Ribbentrop call the tao et al: future I First, Fourth Army guidelines occupation of Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu provinces, the establishment of the three provinces of the Soviet regime. Center maogong region, the the Dadu West Bank and even Xikang bad conditions, "main out like LTHS. on
17 of the tao complex CPC does not agree with the central government's "policy of occupation of Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu provinces proposed Red Army north west" occupying Qinghai, Xinjiang "or" temporarily to South attack "claim. the
20, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Ribbentrop call tao, again northward, "compared with the westward movement of combat is favorable" and Wang Chang Kuo-tao, "immediately came Maogong providers in order to decide everything & rdquo ;. the
6 26, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee meeting in the Maogong County northern two estuaries, to discuss the strategic approach to the problem in the Red, Red Fourth Army. At the meeting, the the Zhou Enlai report: forces eastward and southward impossible to Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gan Jianli base. Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Peng Bo Gu, Wang Jiaxiang, Liu, Luo Fu, Chang Kuo-tao agrees, the 28th, the meeting adopted a decision "on the strategic principle of the First, Fourth Army joined. The decision clearly states: "Our strategic approach is to focus on the main north to attack and destroy the enemy, in the battle of the campaign, a large number, first made in southern Gansu, to create the base of the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area. "And stressed:" In order to achieve this strategic approach, must be resolutely opposed avoid war retreat to escape as well as conservative tendency to seek temporary ease stop the right opportunism shaken is the main danger in the struggle to create a new Soviet Area. (Lssjt.cn) June 29,
, the spirit of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission according to Lianghekou meeting decided to develop "Songpan campaign plan", decided to take advantage of Hu Tsung-nan Ministry of Chiang Kai-shek loyalists arrived in Songpan, bunkers uncompleted timing Songpan region Hu Tsung-nan section with the superior forces of the Red Army Front, the eradication and control of the the Songpan north and northeast various road development operations and to facilitate North. (1 $ dj��.c��m)
the tao Back Red Fourth Army Headquarters resident miscellaneous grains back of the head, do not agree to the north, and to the "unified command organizational issues unresolved reason to do anything, resulting in" Songpan Battle Plan could not be implemented.